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Abstract 
 
Mobile computing devices have become an essential part of everyday life and are becoming 
the primary means for collecting and storing sensitive personal and corporate data. 
Android is, by far, the dominant mobile platform, which makes its permissions model 
responsible for securing the vast majority of this sensitive data. 
 
The current model falls well short of actual user needs, as permission assignments are 
made statically at installation time. Therefore, it is impossible to implement dynamic 
security policies that could be applied selectively depending on context. Users are forced to 
unconditionally trust installed apps without means to isolate them from sensitive data. 
 
We describe a new approach, app sanitization, which automatically instruments apps at 
installation time, such that users can dynamically grant and revoke individual permissions. 
The main advantage of our technique is that it runs in userspace and utilizes standard 
aspect-oriented methods to incorporate custom security controls into the app. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: android; security; privacy; permissions; instrumentation; aspect oriented 
programming; appsanitizer
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1. Introduction 
 
The introduction of the first iPhone in 2007 marked the transition of mobile devices, 
such as cell phones, from specialized platforms into general purpose computers whose 
functionality can be extended by installing third-party applications (a.k.a. apps). Over time, 
the Android platform became the dominant standard with over a billion devices currently 
in active use and over a million applications are available from the Google Play app store 
[18]. Installing any of these applications requires a certain level of trust on part of the user, 
as most apps are given access to sensitive user information.  
The user is given some control over the process as apps need explicit permission to 
access various data and hardware resources on the device, such as contact information, 
GPS location, microphone, camera, etc. Unfortunately, the Android permissions model does 
not provide users with enough control over the installed apps, which can easily result in 
loss of privacy, and has potentially serious security implications in corporate 
environments.  
 
Android Permissions Framework 
 
With few exceptions, Android applications are written in Java and executed by a 
special virtual machine (VM) known as Dalvik. The Dalvik VM consumes bytecode that is in 
a proprietary format; however, it can also be translated to and from standard Java bytecode 
format.  
For an application to gain access to protected data or resources on a device, a 
permission must be obtained from the system [23]. Each application uses its manifest file to 
declare at installation time the permissions it needs; during the installation process, the 
user is given the choice of agreeing to the requested permissions on an all-or-nothing basis. 
That is, either the application is installed with the full complement of permissions it 
requested, or not at all. Once permissions are granted, the application has them for life and 
the user is never consulted again. The only way to revoke a permission is to uninstall the 
application altogether.  
A permission can be defined by individual developers, but normally exists in a set 
contained within the stock Android operating system. If these are not included in the 
metadata, but the application attempts to use a resource under their jurisdiction anyway, a 
security exception is thrown and access is denied. Once agreed, the application can use the 
set of application programming interfaces (APIs) within the Android OS to access protected 
resources. At access time, the Package Manager is utilized by the API to perform 
application authentication for the specified resource. It is notable that no check is 
necessary on the developer’s part—Android automatically handles the permission 
enforcement on every access.  
 
Problems with Android Permissions Framework 
 
There are several problems with the described permissions model; all stem from the 
overall focus on ease of use and the shortsighted view of the resulting weaknesses with 
respect to security and privacy. To understand these problems, we 
representative use cases and show
 
Over-provisioned applications
 
In our first case, Alice (who is an average user)
app. She would likely start by going
of results will follow, and for such a simple application she is likely to pick a free one. 
Additionally, she is conscious of picking a well
for a high 
rating in the 5-
star system. 
The number 
one result 
(Super-Bright 
LED 
Flashlight) is 
free and ranks 
over a 4.75 out 
of 5 (stars) 
based on 
about 560,000 
reviews. Absent any technical expertise, picking that app is a perfectly rationale choice, as 
illustrated by the more than 10 million installations
Figure 1-1. 
At the installation step, 
Figure 1-2: 
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consider several 
 the resulting problems. 
 
 wants to install a simple 
 to the Play Store and search for “flashlight”
-respected application, so she always checks 
, with the store advertisement show 
Alice is presented with the permissions request
Figure 1-1 Simple Flashlight App 
flashlight 
—hundreds 
in 
 shown in 
  
 
At this point, our average user is more than likely to grant the permissions 
requested as she probably does not fully understand the 
permissions grab. The only criterion she can rely
technical expertise gets substituted for trustworthiness.
From a technical perspective, 
required for the stated purpose of the application is 
functionality is built into the app has 
judge. We can surmise that most of it is tied to identifying and tracking the device, and to 
presumably serve targeted ads
Over-provisioning is root
developer’s perspective, there are
their hands on; advertisers live and die on 
attention to, and any information attainable 
user’s lack of recourse empowers developers’ mindsets when asking for permissions. 
Unfortunately, Google—
advertiser influence as the compan
surprising, then, to learn that 70% of all apps collect data 
Figure 
 
3
egregious nature of the requested
 on is reputation, which in the absence 
 
the app is over-provisioned as the only permission 
‘control flashlight’; whatever other 
a different purpose that users are ill-equipped to 
—the source of income for the developer. 
ed amongst several possible causes. From the app 
 monetary incentives to ask for everything they can get 
the ability to deliver ads the user will pay 
that might aid that purpose. Additionally, 
the owner of Android—has no incentive to minimize 
y is driven on an advertisement business 
irrelevant to the main function of 
 
1-2 Permissions Requred (Partial Listing) 
 
of 
 
model. It is not 
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the application [17]; one advertisement library alone is installed on over 350,000 unique 
applications [10]. While no law governs the disclosure of a user’s personal information in 
this manner, most users do not understand the amount of data that apps collect on them.   
Even supposing it is the case that users and developers fully understand and accept 
this permissions framework (along with its implications), malicious applications take 
advantage of this state of affairs. These second order consequences are serious threats, as 
demonstrated with malware designed to hijack an application and redelegate their access 
to a different, arbitrary application [14]. This type of attack is able to utilize the inter-
application communications infrastructure to perform a privileged task without the 
attacking application having such privileges.  
The net effect of over-provisioned apps is twofold: an increased attack surface, and 
an increased exposure of personal information. These problems are exacerbated both by 
the user’s lack of recourse and the static way in which permission policies are 
implemented. 
 
 
Static policy assignment 
 
Consider Bob, who, working as a manager, has access to important company 
information; additionally, he uses his mobile phone to conduct everyday business actions. 
If Bob were to install an application that had access to the camera and/or microphone, as 
well as network access, that application could surreptitiously record audio and/or take 
pictures and send them to unknown parties. Since Bob works with company trade secrets, 
this scenario is especially serious as anything within line of sight to the phone can be 
captured and important conversation could be eavesdropped upon.  
This proof of concept attack has been successfully demonstrated on Android devices 
[15].  Any application (including completely legal and well-respected apps) asking for 
camera rights could carry out this attack. The attack vector involves taking pictures of the 
user’s surroundings, without his knowledge, and sending the images to the remote 
attacker; in turn, the images are combined into a visual 3D model of his environment.  
Other sophisticated attacks utilize the device’s built-in accelerometers to capture 
keystrokes when the phone is placed near a keyboard. Furthermore, and as discussed 
earlier, applications are vulnerable to permission redelegation, further increasing the 
attack surface.  
The cause of these problems is not that the application has been over-provisioned; 
instead the simple fact is that permissions are being abused. The inability for users to do 
anything about this is because of the static manner in which these permissions have been 
assigned.  
A static permissions model means that once an application has been given a 
permission, it cannot be modified. That is, once a user agrees an application can use the 
microphone, it can access the microphone at any time it chooses and in whatever manner 
the application chooses. This is exacerbated by the fact that a user has only one choice 
when installing an application – either to grant the application everything it asks for, or to 
not install the application.  
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Alternatively, dynamic permissions would allow the users to enable or disable 
permissions on a per application basis. Using our process, users must initially accept 
everything the application asks for. However, they can then turn on/off individual 
permissions for individual applications through an easy to understand user interface. In 
addition, information resources (such as contacts) can be faked, which will allow the 
application to function as normal but with completely false data.   
 
 
Confusing and coarsely-grained permissions  
 
Users are presented with a synopsis of needed permissions when installing an app. 
Presupposing that users take the time to read the explanation for each permission, it is 
doubtful whether they understand the implications behind each one. Specifically, users 
exhibit problems caused by confusing category headings, disparities between permissions 
and risk, inability to reason about the absence of permissions, and warning fatigue [19]. 
 
 Confusing Category Headings Overly broad category headings manifest 
themselves in many cases. In particular, the READ_PHONE_STATE permission, under the 
heading “Phone Calls”, leads some users to believe companies have permission to market 
their number to telemarketers. The READ_CONTACTS permission under “Personal 
Information” leads other users to believe that the application would have access to their 
stored passwords. Asked whether or not a given application had permissions to read their 
text messages, users are able to accurately answer only 38% of the time.  
 Unclear Risks of making Resources Available Connecting warnings to risk is 
troublesome for users as well, even if the terms of the warnings in the permission are 
understood. For example, the warning that an application can have “full Internet access” 
leaves much to the imagination – the user must draw their own conclusions as to the risks 
involved with accepting that statement.  
 Absence of Permissions Because of the over 100 default permissions possible for 
the application to ask for, users lose track of or even forget permissions exist. Thus, when 
one is missing, they are not likely to notice. This leads to assessing a similar permission, 
which is asked for, as overly broad in scope.  
 Warning Fatigue Warning fatigue is unavoidable and contributes to the challenge 
of securing personal data. Instead of meeting this challenge with improved warnings or 
reducing low-risk warnings, it is better to change the model altogether by offering the user 
the option to give or take permissions individually. The user should be presented with a list 
of permissions the application asks for, with a checkbox (defaulted to ‘unchecked’) for each 
one, indicating if the application should have access to that particular resource. This way, 
the user is forced to think about what she is giving up instead of blankly accepting a risk 
she is tired of thinking about. 
 With a dynamic permissions model these issues would be circumvented if not 
rendered invalid. Additionally, we can specify our own permissions in as fine grain a 
manner as we wish and have them individually granted or revoked. In this fashion, security 
conscious users would have no qualms about what a particular application is asking for.  
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2. Prior Solutions 
 
Previous solutions have been presented which implement additional protection, 
giving users control of protected resources. There are three general approaches when 
implementing additional resource protections: 1) return the resource unaltered, 2) deny 
any access to the resource, and 3) return fictitious or masked versions of the resource. 
Trusted apps can be given access to personal information, while untrusted apps can be fed 
fictitious data. The ability to return fictitious data is important as applications are expecting 
to have access to resources for which they were originally designed to use; with a denial of 
access, the app may behave erratically.  
These solutions all wrest control from the application at various points in the control 
flow in order to implement additional security measures. 
 
  
Figure 2-1 Android Architecture 
 
 In this representation of Android’s architecture (Figure 2-1), there are several 
modules involved in executing an application's call for data. Each one of them is a control 
point that can be used to incorporate a custom security mechanism. Figure 2-2 lists the 
control points used by previous solutions: 
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Control point Solution 
Content Providers/System Services MockDroid, TISSA 
Android’s Package Manager FlaskDroid 
Application layer (user-space) Dr. Android & Mr. Hide 
 
Figure 2-2 Prior Solutions 
 
 
MockDroid 
MockDroid intercepts the control flow at the System Framework level, within the 
kernel. Developed by Beresford et al. [1], it provides false information to apps if the user 
declares them untrusted. For example, they are able to return a constant, ‘false’, device id 
when an untrusted application attempts to read the device id. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 MockDroid  
  
 This approach relies on modifying both the security checks as well as the content 
provider libraries. The package manager service is the central node for Android security. 
Because every API interfacing sensitive data accesses the package manager, this is a perfect 
opportunity to intercept control flow.  
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MockDroid implements application access verification within Android’s package 
manager class. If the decision is made to ‘mock the data’, the customized package manager 
returns control to the content providers, indicating the user’s decision. 
When a content provider receives a request from an application for which the user 
declares untrusted, an empty data set will be returned. If, on the other hand, the user has 
only allowed the application to have ‘mocked’ data, “plausible but incorrect” results, such 
as a falsified last names, are returned to the application. 
This approach implements dynamic permissions; however, it involves low level 
modification within the kernel. Rewriting part of an operating system, although providing a 
robust solution, is not without drawbacks, and we revisit the issue later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, MockDroid was not demonstrated to be effective for several types of sensors 
and data; only one or two types of data are protected with this system.   
 
 
FlaskDroid 
At the 2013 USENIX Security Symposium, a group of researchers presented their 
work on an improved Android security architecture. This work was realized as a 
framework dubbed FlaskDroid [5].   
FlaskDroid is an implementation of the Flask architecture [21], with heavy 
inspiration from SELinux (or, in this case, SE Android). Flask is a Linux operating system 
implementing flexible security policies, and is now incorporated into SELinux (a popular 
security conscious distribution). 
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Figure 2-4 FlaskDroid 
  
In this architecture, the major change is the way in which access policies are 
implemented. There are three central components that constrict application access to a 
minimum: Context Providers, a Security Server, and a Policy Database. These are in 
addition to modifications to kernel components such as content providers.  
When a system library such as a content provider queries for data, it first reaches 
the newly implemented user-space security server. This server implements policy 
decisions based on input previously received from the user. Depending on the outcome of 
that verification, the calling app is allowed access to the data.  
In addition to the standard resource APIs, this approach also takes into 
consideration a malicious application that has gained root access. To protect against such a 
threat, policy checks are enforced at the syscall level. This means that were a malicious 
application to attempt a MAC level query, FlaskDroid would be able to intercept the call and 
respond appropriately.  
The vetted nature of the Flask operating system, and by extension the FlaskDroid 
operating system, provides for a sound approach to policy management. In addition, 
FlaskDroid protects from malware with root access. 
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The major drawback this approach exhibits is consistent with other work – 
extensive modification of the operating system is required.  
 
 
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide 
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide are two processes that work together to intercept control 
flow of the app within the Application layer and execute entirely in user space [16]. 
 
 
Figure 2-5 Dr. Android Mr. Hide 
 
 
Dr. Android and Mr. Hide instrument target applications. Instrumentation is the act 
of modifying a program’s bytecode representation without having access to the source 
code.  This is possible because strongly-typed interpreted languages use an intermediate 
representation, known as bytecode, which retains all necessary symbolic information, 
allowing additional code to be spliced in.  
The instrumented version of the app is almost exact replica of the original 
application, except that calls using privacy-related APIs are replaced with calls to a 
modified implementation of the API. This duplicate API, loaded into userspace, will cause 
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the application to exhibit a new behavior when utilizing methods within it. For example, 
the duplicated API might block network access if the request is to a known malicious URI.  
Written in OCaml, the instrumentation mechanisms are non-trivial to use for the 
average Java developer.  Additionally, this approach relies on up-to-date Android APIs, 
which are continuously updated over time. Finally, this method does not provide dynamic 
control of permission revocation.  
 
Drawbacks  
These methods presented have achieved securing sensitive data and resources on 
the Android platform. However, to implement these features in most of the methods above, 
a modification of Android source code is required. The fallout from this simple fact is far 
reaching. Some of these disadvantages include:  
 
• Recompilation of the Android operating system is necessary 
• Custom ROM is needed to install the new version of the operating system 
• Future updates released for the Android operating system are not likely to be 
folded into the custom operating system 
o Future updates released for the Android operating system could 
break the way these modifications work 
• Technical knowledge is needed to flash ROMs and reinstall operating 
systems on mobile devices  
 
Since Android is open source, developers can easily change source code and 
recompile the system. However, the sheer size and complexity behind operating systems 
can inhibit kernel hackers from doing this in a robust manner. Modifications to such 
complex systems are likely to have unintended, unsafe, and insecure consequences.  For 
this reason, warranties on mobile devices are generally voided upon installation of such 
changes. 
These devices are, by design, resistant to installation of unverified software; a user 
must first overwrite such built-in security mechanisms. This process includes flashing new 
Read Only Memory (ROM) to the device, which in turn disables verification of the update 
being pushed. If the user then trusts the source of the new operating system, he will be able 
to install the operating system. Should any step in this dubious process fail, it is possible for 
the device to become ‘bricked’, effectively rendering the device useless. In these situations, 
and if it is possible in the given situation, the user usually resorts to restoring the device to 
the as-purchased state. The majority of Android users cannot be expected to exhibit this 
level of technical knowledge.  
Another drawback of using a custom operating system is that updates to the original 
operating system are not necessarily going to be installed on the device. This fact alone 
should discourage installation of unsupported constructs. Should the custom operating 
system implement updates from Android, it is possible that updates to any part of the 
kernel interfere with the customizations made, making the device more unstable if usable 
at all.  
Despite the number of drawbacks, there are some important advantages to a kernel 
space solution, the largest of which is that it provides a higher level of assurance by 
 12
ensuring that protection is not circumvented. In particular, if malware were to gain root 
access on the device, it is still possible to protect the resources. Separately, apps can be run 
as-is with no need for modification. 
 Dr. Android and Mr. Hide, while providing the advantage of making all modifications 
solely in userspace, does not allow for a dynamic permissions model.  In addition, it must 
continuously update its libraries to match that of the current API release. Finally, the 
instrumentation must be written in OCaml, which would have a relatively steep learning 
curve.  
To eliminate the largest of these drawbacks, while still achieving the same goals, we 
developed a method that allows any application to be automatically instrumented with our 
sanitization process, thereby giving us control at important junctions in the flow of the 
program. Based on that, we implement a dynamic, user-defined permissions model that 
effectively supersedes the default one.  
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3. New Approach: Aspect-Oriented Programming 
 
We have developed a methodology to transform applications such that users can 
control how these applications access protected resources. The idea is similar to the one 
proposed by Jeon et al. [16], in that it uses bytecode instrumentation as a means to 
intercept the control flow of the application within user space. However, instead of using a 
custom bytecode instrumentation tool (written in OCaml), we utilize an aspect-oriented 
programming (AOP) approach, which allows us to write the control code in Java, and splice 
it into the original application using the de facto standard Java AOP implementation, 
AspectJ [8]. The benefits of the approach are threefold: a) developers of the access control 
enforcement point can utilize the Android environment; b) our implementation does not 
require the tracking and replication of the rapidly evolving Android SDK capabilities; and c) 
it reduces access-control-induced latency by performing the checks inside the application’s 
process.  
 
Bytecode instrumentation with AspectJ 
 
As discussed earlier, Android applications are compiled into a series of instructions 
prior to execution. These instructions – the bytecode – are then interpreted by the Dalvik 
virtual machine. Instrumentation is the act of modifying these instructions. For instance, 
we can modify every instruction accessing personal data to instead return an empty data 
set. Aspect oriented programming gives us the ability to find every set of such instructions. 
 
Suppose we wish to modify a query into the contacts database. The normal call is of 
the form: 
 
  
 
 
query 
public final Cursor query(Uri uri, 
                          String[] projection, 
                          String selection, 
                          String[] selectionArgs, 
                          String sortOrder) 
Query the given URI, returning a Cursor over the result set. 
 
Parameters: 
 uri  - The URI, using the content:// scheme, for the content to retrieve. 
 projection - A list of which columns to return.  
 selection - A filter declaring which rows to return.  
 selectionArgs - The values will be bound as Strings. 
 sortOrder - How to order the rows 
Returns: 
 A Cursor object, which is positioned before the first entry, or null 
  AspectJ can modify the query prior to execution yet after arguments have been 
assigned values. We will selectively modify the query 
changing the query’s selection criteria
 
 
  
The code shown in Figure 3
passes a conditional branch, line 33, 
the query’s criteria. When the program 
database, it will necessarily find
proceed function is how an aspect 
control flow to resume as normal; in this case, the query will execute and return its result 
to the application.  
Now that we have the code we want to run, we find all points in the 
access the contacts database. Aspect oriented programming is the ideal paradigm to
in this case. With it, we are able to crosscut 
(additional or modified behavior) at all 
application code) we specify.  
 
Our join point for contacts looks like the following:
 
 
The name of the pointcut is used when defining the advice type later in the aspect. The 
type ‘call’ is used to weave when the function is cal
return type can be used to more exactly filter what methods we want to weave throughout 
the target program. With the wildcard 
the function, here ‘query. This specifies the name of the function(s) we want to weave. 
While this supports wildcards, as well as classpath filtering, we limit our weave points to 
the function name. The last part of the pointcut to defi
our example, we allow any number of arguments.
Figure 3-
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to return an empty cursor
. 
-1 will, conditionally, shut off access to a database. If it 
it will append a false condition, “where 0
executes the query to get a cursor to the 
 nothing – a cursor pointing to an empty dataset
hands control back to the application in order for 
application that
the entire application, applying advice 
join points (specified locations within the 
 
 
Figure 3-2 Pointcut Breakdown 
led within the original program.
‘*’, it will match any return type. Next is the name of 
ne is the argument specification. In 
 
1 Code to implement when accessing contacts 
 by 
 
”, line 36, to 
contacts 
. The 
 
 follow 
cut 
 The 
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The final step remaining combines the code we want to execute at the pointcuts we 
specify within a single object. This object is known as an aspect.  
 
 
 
 
 
This aspect, show in Figure 3-3, will utilize a pointcut to capture all calls within the 
application’s code matching the function name “query” (line 3). Additional requirements 
are imposed on the pointcut, assuring that any matched functions both have specified 
arguments and exist within a specified classpath. These additional restrictions allow us to 
specify what classes we weave into; without8 them, we could potentially instrument more 
bytecode than we wish to. Lines 7 and 8 declare that the following code should be applied 
around all found pointcuts matching the criteria. The ‘around’ advice is used when we want 
to modify the functionality at weaving point; alternative types of advice can modify control 
flow either before or after the weaving point.  
 
A graphical representation of this flow is represented with Figure 3-4.  
 
1. public aspect aspect24adba4 {   
2.       pointcut anyQuery (Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selec
tionArgs, String sortOrder)   
3.     : call(* query(..))   
4.         && args(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder)   
5.         && within (  (com.google.ads.u) || .... );   
6.        
7.     Object around(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
s, String sortOrder)   
8.     : anyQuery(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder) {   
9.         try {   
10.             if (accessingContactsDatabase()) {   
11.                 if (blockContacts == false){   
12.                     //do nothing   
13.                     System.out.println("[!]Allowing access to contacts");   
14.                 } else {   
15.                     //block access 
16.                     System.out.println("[!]Blocking access to contacts"); 
17.                     selection = selection + “ where 1 > 2 ”; 
18.                }   
19.             }  
20.         } catch (Exception e) {   
21.             System.out.println(e);   
22.         }   
23.    return proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);   
24.    }   
Figure 3-3 Contact Blocking Aspect 
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Figure 3-4 AppSanitizer  
 
 After applying aspects to the application, the requests going to the system 
framework (denoted with the ‘1’ and intercepted control line), have been weaved based on 
our advice. Instrumenting bytecode in this fashion leaves both the application and 
operating system agnostic to the fact that we’ve gained control.  
 
Automation 
 
We have built a process to automatically perform bytecode instrumentation. 
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The first step in the 
process is attaining the target 
application file. While the routine 
method involves visiting Google’s 
Play Store, .apks can be installed 
from any source. For our 
purposes, we utilized open 
source libraries that crawl the 
Play Store, downloading apps as 
if it were an Android device. This 
was successful in downloading 
about 100 applications before 
being blocked by Google’s 
servers. A more effective method, 
although not autonomous
involves a third party extension
for Google Chrome
ApkDownloader.  
Once the .apk has been 
downloaded, we begin the 
process of implementing 
additional security measures. The 
format of an .apk  archive allows 
us to unzip the file and gain 
access to the bytecode. This code 
is in an Android specific format, 
Dalvik bytecode. In order to 
utilize well-established tools, 
convert the Dalvik bytecode back 
to Java bytecode thereby granting 
use of tools made specifically to 
study, modify, and rebuild Java 
bytecode (such as AspectJ). This 
conversion process is performed 
with the Dex2Jar suite of tools, 
and the output is in Java’s .class
format. 
We could immediately begin applying aspects to Java’s bytecode, however, to 
minimize the amount of work done when recompiling the instrumented bytecode, we first 
want to get a list of all classes 
finding all classes that contain a particular function call. Obfuscation would normally 
present a barrier to this method, however since w
API we can be sure the function 
that make these targeted API calls as additional criteria when applying our aspects.
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The aspects are then ready to be applied. The AspectJ tool suite includes a special 
compiler, AspectJ compiler, or ajc. We provide ajc with the aspects we’ve defined as well as 
all .class files derived from the original Android application. Ajc will apply the aspects to 
the bytecode and output a new .jar archive. Still in the Java format, we use another tool in 
the Dex2Jar toolchain, jar2dex, to get back to our desired Android format, Dalvik bytecode. 
This bytecode, output as a .dex file, replaces the .dex file within the original application’s 
archive. With the new bytecode inside its archive, the .apk is ready to be resigned and 
reinstalled. 
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Instrumentation for Dynamic Permissions 
 
In the Android API, there are only a few ways to utilize or access protected 
resources, and we have broken these down by what archetype of resource they are most 
closely related to. We focus on Sensors, which includes the camera, network radio, and GPS 
radio, as well as Databases, which include contact information, calendar, and account 
information. While the functions of resources within these archetypes are not necessarily 
similar, the methods to access them through the API are exactly the same; we take 
advantage of this fact when applying aspects. 
 
Databases 
 
Databases are used to store many kinds of information within the device. Of 
paramount importance to privacy is the contacts database, which stores names, phone 
numbers, addresses, photos, and other information. To intercept requests for this data, we 
configure our aspects to match the method within the Android API matching ‘cursor 
query(Uri uri, String[] projection, String selection….)’.  The first argument in this method 
defines what database to pull from by use of a URI. Contact information, for example, is 
accessed with the URI “android.provider.ContactsContract.Contacts.CONTENT_URI". 
Remaining arguments are used for further defining the query, such as the columns to select 
from and the criteria the results must match. When weaving, we only apply additional 
security measures to target URIs.  
Databases also offer a unique opportunity in that we can provide the calling 
application with fake information. We achieve this by copying a database to the device’s 
storage that, while identical in schema, has falsified information in it. Within the aspect, we 
instead generate a cursor, the Android handler for queries, to the falsified database. When 
the cursor is returned to the application, it would have no knowledge it is instead looking 
at false information.  
An aspect applying this style of advice is the following: 
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1. public aspect aspectba818d3 {   
2.    private final String NoChange = "0";   
3.    private final String Block = "1";   
4.    private final String FakeIt = "2";   
5.    SanitizedAppData sad = new SanitizedAppData();   
6.   
7.    pointcut anyQuery (Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
s, String sortOrder)   
8.    : call(* query(..))   
9.        && args(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);   
10.        
11.     Object around(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,String[] selectionArg
s, String sortOrder)   
12.     : anyQuery(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder) {   
13.         System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code --");   
14.         sad.initialize();   
15.    
16.         try {   
17.             if (uriHelper.contactsUri()) {   
18.                 System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has matched the target URI --");   
19.                 System.out.println(" -- 'SAD' setting: " + sad.contactsSetting());   
20.                 if (sad.contactsSetting().equals(NoChange)){   
21.                     //do nothing   
22.                     System.out.println("Allowing access to Contacts");   
23.                 } else if (sad.contactsSetting().equals(Block)) {   
24.                     //block it by making database query which will break   
25.                     System.out.println("Blocking Access to Contacts Database");   
26.                     selection = selection + " and 1 > 2";   
27.                 } else {   
28.                     System.out.println(" --
 Attempting to get into the second database.. --");   
29.                     Cursor myCursor = fakeContactData(uri, projection, selection, se
lectionArgs, sortOrder);   
30.                     return myCursor;    
31.                 }   
32.             }   
33.         } catch (Exception e) {   
34.             System.out.println(" --
 Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code, but failed to successfully interrupt the sys
tem call --");   
35.             System.out.println(e);   
36.             proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);    
37.         }   
38.         return proceed(uri, projection, selection, selectionArgs, sortOrder);   
39.     }   
40.    
41.     public Cursor fakeContactData(Uri uri,String[] projection,String selection,Strin
g[] selectionArgs, String sortOrder) {   
42.         System.out.println("-- Opening Database to /sdcard/contacts2.db --");   
43.         SQLiteDatabase myDB = SQLiteDatabase.openOrCreateDatabase("/sdcard/contacts2
.db", null);   
44.         return myDB.query("view_contacts", projection, selection, selectionArgs, nul
l, null, null, null);   
45.     }   
46. }   
Figure 3-6 Contacts Aspect 
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Figure 3-6 contains an entire aspect. Combining both the pointcut, lines 7 through 9, 
and the advice, lines 11 through 49.  The net effect of this aspect is to splice into the 
application at any point a ‘query’ function is called with the following logic: a) if the target 
database is the contacts database, then b) proceed by following user’s selection by allowing 
access to the database, denying access to the database, or returning a cursor to the 
alternative database with fake information, and finally c) return the cursor to application, 
thereby conceding control back to its original state.  
 
Sensors 
 
The GPS radio is a sensor attached to Android devices. This peripheral is one of the 
most unnecessarily requested by applications; ad supported apps generally require it. In 
order to activate the radio within code, developers use the high-level procedure 
getSystemService(String name), where name is, in this instance, “location”. The returned 
object is a LocationManager, which has callback functions for when it is updated. Crafting a 
malformed LocationManager, and returning that in place of what the application is 
expecting, prevents the application from receiving any kind of update.  
An HTTP Download service is built into the API for managing downloads from the 
internet. To utilize this method, developers use the same getSystemService(String name) 
method, but provide “download” to the procedure. The resulting returned object is of type 
DownloadManager. Weaving into this point, we can similarly craft a response preventing 
the DownloadManager from completing its download. 
 
 
1.public aspect aspect262fac6 {   
2.    pointcut systemServiceCut(String theString)   
3.    : call(* getSystemService(..))   
4.        && args(theString)   
5.        && within(com.QrBarcodeScanner.Encode.*);   
6.       
7.    Object around(String theString)   
8.    : systemServiceCut(theString) {   
9.        System.out.println(" -- Sanitizer has reached our Weaved Code --");   
10.         if (theString.equalsIgnoreCase("download")) {   
11.             if (sad.httpDownload().equals(NoChange)){   
12.                 //do nothing   
13.                 System.out.println("Allowing access to HTTP Download");   
14.             } else if (sad.httpDownload().equals(Block)) {   
15.                 //block it by returning a bad service   
16.                 System.out.println(" -- Blocking Download --");   
17.                 return proceed(" ");   
18.             }   
19.         }   
20.         return proceed(theString);   
21.     }   
22. }   
Figure 3-7 System Service Aspect 
  
 In order to grant the user 
allow access, to deny access, or in some 
application on the device to write
resource, the SD card is an easy way to share information between the settings application 
and the instrumented application. 
however this method requires the settings application to be
background as a service. While providing the advantage of no read/write operations to the 
SD card, the drawbacks include that Android can kill background 
low on memory.  
To make these decisions, w
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the application demonstrated in Figure 3
permissions on a per-application basis. 
 
Location Based Permissions 
 In addition to allowing the user to selectively grant and revoke
permissions, a location based access policy is useful.
installations, for instance, no pictures should be taken
employees in corporate environments will have a smartphone on or near them; were a 
device to be infected with malware, attackers could gain access to valuable company trade
Figure 3
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secrets. To this end, aspects can be configured to detect whether or not the device is within 
a certain distance from a given location. If so, information can be hidden from instrumented 
applications, and sensor access can be revoked.  
4.  Results 
To study the effectiveness of 
‘AppSanitizer’, and conducted several case studies. 
 
General Usage 
 
Assuming that we have attained a copy of the apk we wish to 
process by dropping the file into our pipeline.
 
 
 
 There are several options for sanitization. While the default is to cut across the 
entire application, we provide the option to reduce the amount of instrumentation done to 
the source application. Upon sanitization
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our process, we built a proof of concept
 
‘sanitize’, we begin the 
  
, we see output similar to the following
Figure 4-1 Sanitizer GUI 
 process named 
 
:  
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Case Studies 
 
DW Contacts 
 
 DW Contacts is a free application aimed at enhancing or replacing the standard 
phone application packaged within Android [22]. Most features advertised relate to 
accessing and communicating contacts quickly and efficiently, whether via SMS, MMS, 
email, or a normal phone conversation. 
 This application was chosen due to its large volume of downloads (up to 5 million) 
as well as an easy way to show the ability to provide fake information  
  
58:Sanitizer cdstelly$ SanitizeAPK.py -c true -a DWApp.apk  
[*] Beginning Sanitization 
[-] Cleaning the working directory 
[-] Decompiling the APK 
 dex2jar DWApp.apk -> outJar.jar 
[-] Generating random class name 
[-] Aspect Name: aspectd138229 
[-] Finding the classes which call: "query" 
[-] Preparing the environment... 
[-] Weaving aspect from just .class files..:  
[-] 8 warnings 
[-] Now we have the jar.. let's generate a dex! 
[-] jar2dex ./target/classes/post-compile-time/output.jar -> classes.dex 
[-] call com.android.dx.command.Main.main[--dex, --no-strict, --
output=/Users/cdstelly/Code/Android/Thesis/Sanitizer/classes.dex, 
/Users/cdstelly/Code/Android/Thesis/Sanitizer/target/classes/post-compile-
time/output.jar] 
[-] updating: classes.dex 
[-]  zip warning: Local Entry CRC does not match CD: classes.dex 
 (deflated 60%) 
[-] Signing the apk 
[-] sign DWApp.apk -> DWApp-signed.apk 
[-] Removing the currently installed application.. 
[-] * daemon not running. starting it now on port 5037 * 
[-] * daemon started successfully * 
[-] Success 
[-] Installing the modified version.. 
2151 KB/s (3255732 bytes in 1.477s) 
 pkg: /data/local/tmp/DWApp-signed.apk 
[-] Success 
Figure 4-2 Sample Sanitization 
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In Figure 4-3, we see normal operation of the application – loading of contact names. 
After instrumenting the application’s bytecode, launching the application results in the 
screen presented in Figure 4-4. The user has been notified with the standard Android 
notification system; optionally, an alert is fired, and an icon appears in the top left of the 
status bar.  
Upon inspection of the notification (i.e., pulling down the notification bar), the 
following selection is presented to the user (Figure 4-5).  
 
 
  
Figure 4-3 DW Contacts 
(Unmodified) 
Figure 4-4 DW Contacts  
(Instrumented) 
 the app has cached.   
If she selected the option to fake all contact information for DW Contacts, 
time she runs the app he could 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Notification contacts were accessed
 (Instrumented)
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Three options are 
displayed: Allow, Fake, 
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notification itself
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block data.
As show 
previously with
3, the user 
modify the privacy 
settings of any sanitized 
app he has installed. 
saving, he should restart 
the app sh
modify the settings of. 
This is not strictly 
necessary, but should be 
done to clear 
expect to see the image in Figure 4-6.  
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Fictitious data has been given to 
the application. This will ensure that 
even though we are modifying the 
application to protect our privacy, the 
application will continue to behave as 
normal.  
As the fictitious data resides in 
userspace, it could be modified at any 
time. Thus, it is possible to populate the 
database with ‘masked’ data, which 
could prove to be a useful middle 
ground between privacy and 
application usability. Masked data could 
take the form of contacts which last 
names were all replaced with a mask 
character, such as the letter ‘x’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Super-Bright LED Flashlight 
 
 In our case studies used to describe the permissions issue, we looked at the ‘Super-
Bright LED Flashlight’ app [20]. Since it has been installed up to 500 million times, or one in 
five Android devices worldwide, it is worth a deeper look. 
 
Prior to download, the following permissions are required:  
Figure 4-3 DW Contacts with fictitious contacts 
(instrumented) 
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The number of permissions is too many – there is only one required for a flashlight 
app, and that is “control flashlight”. With network and camera access, this application has 
the facility to execute the PlaceRaider attacks as discussed earlier. The application is ad-
supported, however, and as such can reasonably require network access. On the other 
hand, the application also has the ability to upload information with ‘full network access’. 
Clearly, this application is over-provisioned.  
 
 
Your location 
precise location (GPS and network-based) 
approximate location (network-based) 
Network communication 
view network connections 
full network access 
view Wi-Fi connections 
receive data from Internet 
Phone calls 
read phone status and identity 
Storage 
modify or delete the contents of your USB storage 
Your applications information 
retrieve running apps 
Camera 
take pictures and videos 
Development tools 
change system display settings 
System tools 
modify system settings 
test access to protected storage 
Affects Battery 
control flashlight 
prevent device from sleeping 
Figure 4-4 Permissions required for installation of "Super Bright LED Flashlight" 
  
 
 We immediately notice the ads at the bottom 
Internet permissions. However, without doing anything remotely close to network traffic 
analysis, one can simply look at the 
running to see that it is sending off the device id and several kinds of private information 
off to an ad service. 
 
 
 
Figure 
Figure 4-6 Logcat Output: Device ID being given to an 
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- this is the plausible cause
standard debugging output of the application when
 
4-5 Super-Bright LED Flashlight  
(Unmodified) 
ad service, along with other encrypted strings
 for full 
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 This is in addition to several encrypted strings appearing in the standard output. We 
do know that the app requires exact GPS location permissions, so it is possible that it is 
encrypting your location (for use with the ads, hopefully).  
 Applying the same sanitization process to the flashlight apk, we were able to block 
all network access. The effects of this are at least twofold: 1) the application cannot upload 
any information about the device, and 2) ads are no longer displayed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 This application is a prime example of why these kinds of apps should have a more 
versatile permissions model. When we trust an application with any combination of 
permissions including full network access, we must be wary of the possible consequences.   
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 4-7 FlashlightApp (Instrumented) 
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5. Critique of Methods 
 
While we achieve the goal of implementing dynamic privacy controls, we have 
discovered drawbacks with our method. These include:  
 
• Advanced obfuscation techniques inhibit ability to recompile some 
applications 
• To install these apps, we must resign other people’s work 
• If the device’s available memory runs low, the permission watching service 
could be killed and the user will not be notified until restarting the service or 
device 
• When Android eventually implements required permissions to read/write 
the SD card, we will have to add that permission to the application’s manifest 
• Many apps are advertiser based; this method can prevent ads from running 
 
Many developers obfuscate their application’s code prior to release. This is an 
effective way to prevent reverse engineers from immediately realizing the purpose of a 
given method. Our design takes this into account as we consider the fact that Android API 
calls cannot be obfuscated – to utilize certain functionality, you must use the methods 
provided. What was unaccounted for, however, was the inability for our decompilation and 
recompilation tool (dex2jar) to handle obfuscation techniques. The dex2jar suite works 
well in most cases of obfuscation, but for some apps (such as Google Chrome), the 
recompilation process did not work as planned. Although the decompilation and weaving 
processes worked as intended, more research into this, or perhaps a future update of the 
dex2jar tool, are required to provide a completely robust solution.  
One consideration our work brings to light is that in order to install the modified 
application, we must re-sign the original developer’s work as any modifications break the 
original developer’s signature. From a functional standpoint, this is no problem. However, 
original developers can be understandably displeased with such actions.  
In order to utilize the run-time warnings that notify the user when a sensitive 
resource is active, we deploy a service that runs in the background processes of the device. 
Once the aspect is accessed, the warning comes from this service vice weaved code. As all 
devices are constantly trying to conserve battery, they periodically kill inactive services. 
While this behavior was not witnessed when testing, the shutdown of the service would 
prevent the user from being warned their information was being accessed. However, the 
aspects would continue to function as normal and would follow any settings already set in 
place.  
Once side effect we introduce is that advertisements can be effectively disabled 
when we deny network access to an application. An issue worthy of a debate in itself, this 
can be seen as both a fantastic side effect for end users and as a negative consequence for 
developers who are financially supported by advertisements.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Mobile devices are increasingly trusted with information of both corporate and 
personal varieties. The largest platform by far, Android, has not even come close to 
implementing an exemplary security model with regards to protection of this information. 
Likewise, protection for hardware sensors on Android devices has fallen by the wayside.  
The lack of protection falls well short of user needs while simultaneously presents a 
serious security threat. 
A variety of causes contribute to the lack of protection. Statically assigned 
permissions, which must be agreed upon prior to application installation, cannot be 
changed at any time. Rampant numbers of apps are over-provisioned, each asking for 
ludicrous access to personal information or completely unrelated hardware sensors.  
This is a well-known set of problems, and prior solutions have approached it from 
the ground up; that is, they have focused on implementing reasonable security policies 
within Android’s open source kernel. While these solutions have achieved the goals of 
improving Android with such security policies, they are severely hampered by the way in 
which they have implemented them; the re-writing of operating system source code is 
unnecessary and burdensome.  
Alternatively, other prior work has implemented improvements to the security 
model at the application layer, within userspace, bypassing the excessive drawbacks 
caused by operating system modification. This prior work, however, could be improved 
upon by use of standard, well-understood technologies, as well as expansion of goals and 
implementation.   
Our research, instantiated in the form of AppSanitizer, provides an ideal solution for 
implementation of reasonable security policies within Android.  These policies revert the 
static nature of permission assignment, while simultaneously giving the user the power to 
grant and revoke individual permissions on a per-application basis. For permissions that 
access information, such as contacts, AppSanitizer can reliably return fictitious data. 
AppSanitizer is also automated, providing an additional advantage for this approach.  
The main benefit of this work is the grant to a user the ability to control whether or 
not an application can access a protected resource, post-install time, without modifying the 
operating system.  
 
Future Work 
Future work could implement the sanitization process on the device itself, 
bypassing the need for ad-hoc installation and instrumentation. Because this solution likely 
requires root access of the device, an alternative may be to provide the sanitation of apps 
as a web service.  
In a different light, the ability to easily instrument Android apps is not limited to 
improvement of security policies. This approach can be used in a variety of situations; 
almost any behavior can be implemented if an appropriate aspect is written.  
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